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ABSTRACT: The paper begins by criticizing the usual division of Latin America philosophy 
into three stages: founders, forgers and thecnicians. Then the history of philosophy in 20th in 
Mexico is narrated with the help of four maps that indicates the main positions and names. 
Towards the end, two kinds of lessons are drawn. The first is to promote the destruction of the 
vices of such a philosophy to regain its virtues. The second lesson comes from interpreting the 
metaphors of the previous maps: we are victims of shipwreckes living in archipielagos and thus 
we may explore their transitions.  
 




As an auxiliary to history, each chronology structures a certain time, gives some order 
to events, and gives food for thought. In what way? When a chronology presents ideas 
of a time lapse, that chronology usually invites us to investigate it in more detail; for 
example, to elucidate one of the movements or figures of that time. But research can 
become more ambitious and aim to compare chronologies and point out continuities 
and ruptures, with developments of ideas in similar times in other places. However, 
these historical, or historiographical lessons are not the only type of lessons that a 
chronology can offer. That is why, although the main goal of this paper is to 
introduce—just to introduce, very briefly—a chronology of Mexican philosophy in the 
20th century by way of enumerating its main movements and figures (section II in this 
paper) in a small complementary discussion, I will suggest some other lessons to draw 
from these developments. This second type of lessons can be generated from questions 
that provoke discussions such as the following: Why have philosophical discussions 
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shifted from having an interest in certain topics to others? What internal and external 
factors led to those changes? What are the epistemic and practical virtues and vices that 
generated the changes, or are these virtues and vices a byproduct of those changes? 
What can we learn for our own research in the present times about those past 
discussions and their changes? (sections 3 and 4). However, before these reflections at 




Telling a story about philosophical thought is not an innocent task: it at least involves 
evaluating those thoughts and organizing them with justification. If these tasks are 
carried out from what we might call “nomadic thought”—a way of thinking freely that 
does not adhere to received distinctions and that risks crossing unknown territories—
then any typology or chronology becomes disputable. At most, we should think of these 
as proposals to be taken up in discussion. Such thinking relies on various procedures. 
One of them is the “strategy of detours,” or horizontal nomadism, wherein many side 
paths are taken in order to locate a problem in relation to other problems of the past or  
present. So, before offering this short history of philosophy in Mexico, I want to take 
two preparatory detours. 
First preparatory detour: Mexican philosophy, and Latin American philosophy in 
general, are sometimes reconstructed teleologically across three stages, which together 
are supposed to display an ascending character, or to constitute signs of progress (Miró 
Quesada 1974). These stages are: the stage of the founders, that of the forgers, and that 
of the technicians. However, so that we can dismiss this false teleology, I think it would 
be advisable, among many other corrections, to replace the word “founders” with the 
rather ugly word “forgetters.” This is because the word “founders” seems to overlook—
or rather to obliterate—the very rich philosophical past of New Spain in many Latin 
American countries like Mexico. In a similar fashion, efforts have been made, even 
presently, to disregard the significance of nineteenth-century liberal republicanism in 
these countries; but surely these movements contain more interesting philosophical 
ideas than is usually assumed. Moreover, and quite unsurprisingly, the vast, varied, and 
extremely rich body of indigenous thought is routinely despised in these histories of 
Mexican philosophy. 
 Also, the meaning of the word “forgers” is not very clear. Leaving aside the usual 
sense of the term in English—a “forger” is typically a “falsifier”—the word “forger” is 
sometimes meant to refer to someone who creates something with a great deal of work 
and effort. Thus, “to forge” is sometimes used almost interchangeably with the verbs 
“to build,” “to devise,” “to imagine,” “to invent,” or “to project”. In the history of 
philosophy, thinkers like Plato, Augustine, or Hume are fittingly called “forgers”: those 
who “forge”—imagine, construct, invent—arguments and theories that, from different 
perspectives and with profound originality, illuminate realities. If to those venerable 
names we looked for their equivalents in Mexican philosophy, specifically among 
writers in Spanish, we should immediately include Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, José 
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object: some of these Mexican figures expressed themselves mainly in poems or in 
essays. But, by the same token, would we thereby consider Plato (who wrote 
dialogues), Augustine (the author of confessions), and Hume (an essayist), minor 
thinkers? Starting with irreverent or perhaps silly questions like these allows us to 
understand that this three-stage teleology of Latin American philosophy has been built 
to exalt the third stage. It’s as though one can hear the following veiled remark: “At 
last there are people in these second-rate, desolate lands who read the latest papers 
published in academic journals. Finally, and fortunately, these folks no longer think for 
themselves, but now, with discipline, limit themselves to commenting on and discreetly 
introducing questions or, perhaps, minor doubts—if they are bold enough—regarding 
whatever might be discussed in the Headquarters of Thought.” For this reason, the stage 
of the “technical philosophers”—the third, and supposedly most glorious level in this 
teleology—is perhaps better understood as occupied by people completely dominated 
by the vices of subaltern fervor and craving for novelties. 
I said that I was going to introduce two preparatory detours. My second detour aims 
to tell this short history of philosophical thought in Mexico as a succession of maps. 
With. maps we usually organize space for the purpose of providing guidance. Thus, 
maps are drawn on different scales depending on our needs. An undetailed map might 
help us if what we need is a very general sense of direction. But if we want to find a 
precise place, we need very specific maps. At the same time, in a manner similar to 
how maps of spaces are constructed—and this is my conjecture—we can also use 
nomadic thinking in order to draw maps of times and histories. These successive maps 
allow us to articulate yet another procedure of nomadic thinking, namely the “strategy 
of transitions,” or vertical nomadism, which serves to shift the level of abstraction with 
which we attend to a problem. 
Of course, in the following four maps we won’t find a teleology, but rather different 
thinkers who are preponderantly founders, or preponderantly forgers, or 
preponderantly technical thinkers, or who, throughout their lives, have moved from one 
role to another. But, just in their characters as maps, the first two can be considered 
preparations for the third map and its successive submaps. The fourth map should be 
seen as a coda that projects into the 21st century and that will need to be analyzed and 
evaluated in the years to come. Unfortunately, with these maps I will be merely listing 




As I have already insinuated, the following four maps—which I offer as ways of 
rethinking the history of philosophy in Mexico in the 20th century—are close to 
caricatures: 
Map 1. The generation of those who strove to restart a fresh culture that emerged 
in Mexico around 1910 as a challenge to the “official ideas” current during the 
Dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911). This effort was sponsored academically by 
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(1882–1959).1 Although they were both trained in positivism, they reacted strongly 
against it in their youth. Among other aspects, this renewal in philosophy was launched 
with a call to disengage from yet another colonial vice, namely nationalist 
enthusiasms, 2  and thus with a call to listen willingly to the voices of universal 
philosophy without paying much attention to local currents of thought (Spanish neo-
scholasticism, French-style positivism in the manner of Comte, the remains of 
nineteenth-century liberalism). However, we also find in Caso and in Vasconcelos a 
deep and persistent concern for the particularities of the Mexican situation, albeit a 
concern that did not always succumb to the vice of nationalist enthusiasms. At the same 
time they displayed a strong interest in metaphysics and aesthetics. (Vasconcelos 
produced a systematic metaphysics, “aesthetic monism.”) Additionally, both thinkers 
displayed confidence in education as an instrument of social progress. In particular, 
Vasconcelos’s project was to rebuild mestizo culture as the basis for  Mexican identity 
and to promote the study of the country's natural and cultural history. Thus, the 
concepts of the “cosmic race” (“raza cósmica”; cf Miller 2004) and of “indianology” 
(“indialogía”) played a central role in this reconstruction.  
We should also mention Samuel Ramos (1897–1959) as this generation’s third 
member. Caso was Ramos’s teacher as well as the one who led him to take an interest 
in aesthetics. However, the extremely negative criticisms that Ramos leveled against 
the psychology of the Mexican people and the culture in Mexico were incompatible 
with the reflections of Caso and Vasconcelos.3 (This fact has led many to question 
whether Ramos really fits within this first map.) 
Map 2. The “Spanish Exiles.” Following the defeat of the Second Spanish Republic 
and the establishment of Francisco Franco's dictatorship, a contingent of philosophers 
arrived in Mexico. These newcomers did not experience exile4 as the situation of 
banished people or as “desterrados;” they instead experienced it as those who had 
changed their country but not their cultures or traditions, and who continued enriching 
those cultures and traditions by looking to new horizons—as “trasterrados,” to use José 
Gaos’s expression. Gaos (1900–1969) was the most influential thinker in this group for 
his teaching, for his work in phenomenology and existentialism, and for his immense 
 
1 Translations of important excerpts by both thinkers are included in Gracia (1986). By Antonio Caso 
are included excerpts from The Human Person and the Totalitarian State (1941) as well as excerpts from 
his main book Existence as Economy, Disinterest, and Charity (Obras completas, 1972). By José 
Vasconcelos are included excerpts from Todología and from Philosophy Manual (Obras completas, 
1961). There are also other important translations of texts by Caso and Vasconcelos in Sánchez and 
Sanchez, Jr. (2017).                                      
2  For a characterization of these three vices—subaltern fervor, craving for novelty, nationalist 
enthusiasms—see Pereda (2006: 192–203), and Pereda (2013). 
3 Ramos’s (1962) main book on the collective psychology of Mexican society was originally written in 
1934. 
4 Throughout the 20th century, exile was a frequent experience for many Spanish and Latin American 
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and generous interest in the past of Mexican thought.5 The brief stay in Mexico of 
María Zambrano (1904–1991) also left traces of poetic thinking that were diffuse but 
deep. In addition, the works and teaching of José María Gallegos Rocafull (1895-1963) 
and of Eduardo Nicol (1907–1990) were of some importance. 
Map 3. The “Era of the big blocs.” These blocs were formed directly or indirectly 
from the teachings of the Spanish exiles. (Of course, these teachings also promoted, 
among many good things, a few colonial vices.) Appealing now to more specific maps, 
I refer to the following “big blocs”: 
 
The “Mexicanism” of the Hyperion group, with thinkers such as Jorge Portilla (1919–
1963) and Emilio Uranga (1921–1988).6 We might also mention, apart from this group, the 
historiographical work of Carmen Rovira (1923-).  
 
“Latin Americanism.” The best-known philosopher with more enduring work in this field 
was Leopoldo Zea (1912–2004). According to Zea, there are reciprocal relationships 
between historical facts and ideas. Zea defended the idea of a united Latin America, and—
with no less force—the idea that the discovery of 1492 in fact gave way to a concealment 
of cultures and knowledge.7 This bloc might also include the comprehensive theories—
indebted to liberation theology and Marx—of Enrique Dussel (1934-), the most influential 
representative of the Latin American philosophy of liberation.8 
 
Marxism, whose most decisive philosophical figure was Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez (1915–
2011), with his reasoned and energetic proposal for a philosophy of praxis. But it is also 
important to mention Bolívar Echevarría (1941–2010), with his revaluation of the baroque 
ethos as a way of thinking about Latin America and his attack on the “metaphysics of 
whiteness” as the generator of modernity. Nor should we overlook fragments of the work 
of Carlos Pereyra (1940–1988), especially those indebted to Althusserian Marxism and his 
pages bearing witness to a progressive critical departure from such a perspective. 
-The analytic tradition. With his contributions to deontic logic, Eduardo García Máynez 
(1908-1993) in the 1950s introduced analytic philosophy to Mexico. Soon afterwards, Luis 
Villoro (1922-2014), Fernando Salmerón (1925-1997), and Alejandro Rossi (1932-
2009)—based on their severe criticism of the phenomenological training imparted by their 
teacher Gaos—hailed the importance of studying and practicing analytic philosophy, with 
the purpose of “professionalizing” and “normalizing” philosophy in Mexico. According to 
their proposal, philosophy should no longer be a form of “personal confession”—as Gaos 
once characterized it—or a set of social and political proclamations, but rather a rigorous 
body of research like the other sciences. (It should be noted that, regarding Luis Villoro, 
his work in analytic philosophy was just one of many stages in his vast and illuminating 
 
5 In Sánchez and Sánches, Jr (2017) we find translations of Gaos’s “Two Ideas of Philosophy” and “My 
Two Cents: ‘American’ Philosophy?’”. 
6 Both thinkers have recently been of some interest, having been translated and received commentaries 
in English. On Portilla, cf. Sánchez (2012), and Gallegos and Sánchez (2020). On Uranga, cf. Sánchez 
(2021). 
7 Some of Zea’s works in English were published in 1963, 1959a, and 1959b; in Sánchez and Sánchez, 
Jr (2017) we find from Zea, “Philosophy as Commitment” (1952). 
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trajectory. 9  Indeed, his work began with a more or less paternalistic interest in the 
indigenous problem.10 However, throughout his life this interest was transformed, on the 
one hand, into the ability to listen to the needs and projects of indigenous people and, on 
the other hand, into contributions to policies meant to promote their well-being.11) 
 
The metaphysical tradition. In contrast with the other factions, in this case we have a 
“negative bloc”—which might also be referred to as the bloc of “the heterodox.” Its 
members have little or nothing in common with each other, beyond their resistance to 
belonging to other blocs. The figures worth mentioning here are Antonio Gómez Robledo 
(1908–1994), certain fragments of Uranga's thought, Ramón Xirau (1924–2017), as well 
as Juliana González (1936-). One might also place in this group Mauricio Beuchot (1950-), 
who, belonging to a younger generation, has nevertheless attracted attention with his theory 
of analogical hermeneutics. 
 
Feminism. If we are to reconstruct the beginnings of feminism in twentieth-century 
Mexico—and nothing more than its beginnings—we must not overlook the theoretical 
contributions made in essays by the great writer Rosario Castellanos (1925–1974),12 nor 
overlook the pioneering academic work by Graciela Hierro (1928–2003). 
 
Map 4. The “irruption of the Archipelago.” Starting in the late 1980s with the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, Marxism lost much 
of the interest it had garnered in Mexico and as well as some of its public appeal in the 
Western world. It must be remembered that in Mexico—as well as in many regions of 
Latin America—the cause which provoked the most widespread versions of Marxism 
was the vice of subaltern fervor, as in the maddened desire to multiply the franchises 
of Louis Althusser and his disciples in our universities and colleges. Moreover, a strong 
criticism of Marxism had emerged in Paris by that time, including attacks that amount 
to silly misunderstandings of Marx. (It is well known: you never fight more harshly 
and unfairly than against beliefs you used to embrace passionately, and that today are 
no less recklessly considered old-fashioned.) On the other hand, it should be kept in 
mind that academic Marxism in Mexico was not just another bloc: it was the 
“provocative bloc.” Thus, when it fell apart, its militant resistance lost its meaning as a 
binding force. Hence the metaphor of the archipelago. But the image of a shipwreck is 
also appropriate. Indeed, the latter is a metaphor much appreciated by Guillermo 
Hurtado (2016), though he does not simply refer to a shipwreck but rather to a “dialectic 
of a shipwreck”: that is, to a situation in which, if we know how to take advantage of 
it, allows the shipwrecked people—or archipelago dwellers—that we have become to 
 
9 A book belonging to this period is Villoro 1998. 
10  Cf. Luis Villoro, The Major Moments of Indigenism in Mexico: Conclusion, in Sánchez and Sánchez, 
Jr (2017). 
11 On this later period in Villoro’s thinking, it is useful to take into account Pappas (2017). 
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risk entering into a “dialogue as an adventure”13 and, in this way, to be able to combat 




In this very short and disputable account of twentieth-century Mexican philosophical 
thought, the presence of colonial vices, namely subaltern fervor and craving for 
novelty—as well as their opposite, compensating, and equally dangerous vice, namely 
nationalist enthusiasms—have popped up everywhere. However, I am more interested 
here in reconstructing the lessons of a nomadic thought: one that teaches us that 
destroying these vices would allow us to rescue certain virtues, which can in turn aid 
us in continuing to think. Clearly, every vice is a deformed virtue, owing to some lack 
or excess. Now, I think that if the above-mentioned vices are destroyed, we can extract 
valuable materials.  
For example, subaltern fervor and craving for novelty are passive attitudes. Those 
who fall prey to these vices try to empty their minds in order to administer in their 
localities only what is discussed in the Headquarters of Thought, or whatever happens 
to be the academic fashion of the moment. The motto of these people could be: “Let's 
not dirty our thoughts with anything in a personal tone.” Fortunately, this passivity is 
frequently left aside in Mexico, and there is presently in Mexico a kind of recovery of 
attention to personal needs and personal capacity for judgment. Thus, these vices can 
be transformed into virtues, specifically into such virtues as openness, the drive to 
address new problems, or the drive to try to address problems in various ways. In 
contrast, the vice of nationalist enthusiasms develops into attitudes that, in defending 
one’s own identity, are not only active but in fact hostile. All thought becomes not only 
a closely personal affair but also a closely group affair. Consequently, the opposition 
between “us” and “them” is the spur to all cognitive activity. People then become 
unable to think that, in order to be dealt with properly, some issues require an 
impersonal point of view. But once this incapacity is overcome, this vice also becomes 
a virtue: by reaffirming our own identity, we become willing to engage in dialogue with 
other identities, to enrich ourselves with their points of view. 
  We can also extract valuable lessons from those efforts typified by the maps 
picturing stages of Mexican philosophy in the 20th century. For, without a doubt, 
metaphors invite us to continue thinking, and sometimes even force us to explore 
unexpected thoughts. For example, Caso’s and Vasconcelos’s efforts to restart a new 
culture in Mexico exhibit features of deep and rigorous thinking. Furthermore, a way 
of thinking that takes itself seriously cannot fail to make a temporary “clean slate” of 
previous theories. Consequently, it is important from time to time to reexamine our 
problems as if no one had examined them before: to think from the very beginning. Of 
course, such a liberating gesture can also be seen as nothing more than an attitude of 
methodological hygiene as well as an act by which we might recover our strength and 
 
13 Hurtado (2016: 107) not only discusses such a kind of dialogue but also “an archaeology of hope,”. 
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drive. Because no one is ever actually at the beginning. We are rather always in the 
middle of something. 
No less important was the effort carried out by refugees from the Second Spanish 
Republic. Real philosophy is often generated in coexistence with strange thoughts and 
with people from other lands, often exiles who desperately flee from countries that have 
become unlivable. But we do not simply inherit these situations. The difficulty lies in 
knowing how to distinguish—again, something very slippery—between the virtue of 
appropriating new horizons and the vice of subaltern fervor. However, it is important 
to insist that we bear many such inheritances: some from friendly outsiders, others from 
distant foreigners and even from those who, at least at first glance, would appear to be 
unpleasant or hostile—if not enemy—aliens. Thus, let us not be confused: the attitude 
of openness is a way of continuing to think for oneself, while recognizing that 
inevitably one thinks in the middle of something. 
 On the other hand, the establishment of large and conflicting blocs of thought 
frequently awakens dogmatic dreams and, thus, spurs both cooperative and non-
cooperative debates. Consequently, we must make an effort towards arguing in a 
renewed way and in various directions; towards answering reasons to the contrary, and 
towards questioning deep-rooted beliefs and interests. In this way an opportunity arises 
for examining others’ positions as well as our own: because—let us never forget—we 
always think in the middle of something. 
Finally, let's return to the metaphor of the archipelago. The sea not only separates 
those islands composing an archipelago—in this case, the various participants in 
philosophy in Mexico; it also relates those islands to each other in a fluid way. This 
observation leads us to recall one of the aims making up the background for any 
reflection: the aim of integrating—that is, the practice opposed to exclusion—since it 




It is still worth emphasizing that practices of restarting and of appropriating new 
horizons are forms of nomadic thought in which we interrupt distinctions, concepts, 
arguments, and debates, as well as those different forms of consensus that we should 
never accept simply because they are generally taken for granted. Therefore, 
questioning each of these opens up possibilities for thinking and acting along 
overlooked or unimagined paths. Additionally, practices of argument and of connecting 
ideas help us to introduce and to consolidate our need for recognizing and 
acknowledging ourselves in an interactive ecology. Therefore, practices of nomadic 
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